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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 15-2287 
________________ 
 
 
AETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; AETNA WORKERS’ COMP ACCESS, LLC 
 
v. 
 
RARITAN BAY MEDICAL CENTER, a New Jersey Corporation, 
 
        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
FIRST HEALTH LIFE & HEALTH INSURANCE COMPANY;  
AETNA HEALTH, INC.; 
COVENTRY HEALTH CARE, INC. 
 
     ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. No. 3-11-cv-00871) 
District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 17, 2016 
 
Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: December 9, 2016) 
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________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Raritan Bay Medical Center, LLC (“Raritan”) brought claims against Aetna Life 
Insurance Company and Aetna Workers’ Comp Access, LLC (collectively, “Aetna”) for 
breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The 
claims concern a contract called the Managed Care Agreement (“MCA”).1 The dispute 
initially centered on whether certain workers’ compensation products were “issued, 
administered, or serviced by” Aetna and thereby entitled to discounted hospital 
reimbursement rates provided by the MCA. 
 The District Court for the District of New Jersey granted summary judgment to 
Aetna on all of Raritan’s claims, holding that, even if the workers’ compensation 
products were not covered by the agreement, Raritan failed to show that Aetna breached 
it or the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. We affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 A. The MCA 
 Under the MCA Aetna agreed to steer business to Raritan by listing the hospital in 
its Participating Provider directory. MCA § 10.1. In return, Raritan agreed to provide 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 Raritan also brought a claim for negligent misrepresentation. It has not appealed the 
District Court’s dismissal of that claim. 
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medical care at discounted rates to individuals, called “Members,” who are “covered by 
or enrolled in a Plan.” MCA §§ 12.9. A “Plan” is “[a]ny health benefit product or plan 
issued, administered, or serviced by [Aetna.]” MCA § 12.12. A Plan’s “Payor” can be 
“[a]n employer, insurer, health maintenance organization, labor union, organization or 
other person or entity which has agreed to be responsible for” paying for medical care 
provided to Members under the terms of a Plan. MCA § 12.11. 
 When Aetna is not the Payor of a particular Plan, it must tell the Plan’s Payor 
when to pay for services provided to the Plan’s Members and must inform the Payor of 
the discounted rates in the MCA’s Compensation Schedule. MCA § 3.1. The process by 
which bills are translated from Raritan’s ordinary rates to the MCA’s reduced rates is 
called “repricing.” Raritan bills each Payor at Raritan’s non-discounted rates, and Aetna 
then “reprices” the bill by lowering the dollar value of each charge to reflect the MCA’s 
reduced rates. 
 B. The AWCA Program 
 Aetna retained the right to introduce new Plans during the course of the 
agreement. MCA § 8.2. It exercised this right in October 2003 by introducing the Aetna 
Workers’ Compensation Access (“AWCA”) program. Through that program, Aetna 
intended for certain workers’ compensation products to become Plans under the MCA. It 
sent a letter by certified mail notifying Raritan of its choice to introduce the program and 
giving the hospital the opportunity to opt out. Raritan did not opt out before the 
program’s effective date, so on January 1, 2004, it became a participating hospital in the 
AWCA network. 
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 For five years Raritan regularly treated injured workers who were covered by the 
products of workers’ compensation carriers participating in the AWCA program. It 
reevaluated its position in 2010, however, when it treated a worker with particularly 
costly injuries. The hospital’s counsel communicated with Aetna and claimed that 
AWCA participants’ products were not Plans as defined by the MCA, and thus the 
AWCA participants were not entitled to pay the MCA’s discounted rates. Raritan also 
asserted a right to pursue additional payments from AWCA-participating workers’ 
compensation carriers that had previously paid the MCA’s discounted rates for services 
provided to injured workers. 
 C. Litigation 
 Aetna responded by filing a declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that 
Raritan was a Participating Provider, that AWCA participants were entitled to pay the 
MCA’s reduced rates, and that Raritan was not entitled to any further reimbursement 
from AWCA participants, their Members, or Aetna. Raritan answered and filed 
counterclaims against Aetna for, among other things, breach of contract and breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
 Aetna moved for summary judgment on Raritan’s counterclaims, which the 
District Court granted on all but the breach-of-contract counterclaim. The parties’ 
contentions centered on MCA § 12.12, which, to repeat, defines “Plan” as “[a]ny health 
benefit product or plan issued, administered, or serviced by” Aetna. 
 The District Court held that there was a genuine issue of material fact whether the 
services Aetna provided AWCA participants were enough to make their products Plans. 
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The Court, however, granted summary judgment to Aetna on Raritan’s “claim for breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing . . . because the record d[id] not 
indicate that a jury could conclude that Aetna was operating upon anything other than a 
good faith interpretation of the agreement.” J.A. 146 (internal citation and quotation 
marks omitted). In addition, that Raritan and Aetna had different interpretations of the 
MCA “d[id] not mean that Aetna was operating in bad faith.” Id. 
 At the Court’s invitation, Aetna filed a second motion for summary judgment, 
which made a binary argument: first, if the AWCA participants’ products were Plans, 
Raritan could not maintain its breach-of-contract claim because it received everything it 
was entitled to and suffered no damages; second, if the AWCA participants’ products 
were not Plans, Aetna’s conduct toward them (i.e., repricing Raritan’s bills at the MCA’s 
rates) was not covered by, and therefore could not have breached, the MCA. 
 The Court adopted Aetna’s argument, noting that “the MCA imposes no duty on 
Aetna to ensure that the health benefit plans, for which it re-prices services under the 
MCA, meet the parties’ . . . definition of a ‘Plan.’” J.A. 12.  Raritan appeals. 
II. JURISDICTION 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), and our Court has 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The District Court’s summary judgment 
orders disposed of all of Raritan’s claims, and Aetna’s sole claim against Raritan—the 
declaratory judgment claim—was dismissed without prejudice per a joint stipulation. 
 Ordinarily we don’t have jurisdiction over partial appeals “when [a party] has 
asserted a claim in the district court which it has withdrawn or dismissed without 
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prejudice.” Erie Cty. Retirees Ass’n v. Cty. of Erie, Pa., 220 F.3d 193, 201 (3d Cir. 2000). 
However, “[a] final order is not absent just because the district court failed to adjudicate 
all of the claims that were at one time pleaded. Instead, an appellate court must determine 
whether, at the time it is examining its jurisdiction, there remain unresolved issues to be 
adjudicated in the district court.” Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 372 F.3d 193, 
201 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Beazer East, Inc., 124 F.3d 551, 560 
(3d Cir.1997)).  
 There are no unresolved issues awaiting the District Court’s decision. Aetna’s 
declaratory judgment claim was largely the mirror image of Raritan’s breach-of-contract 
claim. Thus the order granting summary judgment in favor of Aetna terminated the 
parties’ dispute as far as the District Court was concerned. 
 Even if the declaratory judgment claim could be construed to reach entities beyond 
Aetna and Raritan, any questions beyond those resolved by the District Court’s rulings 
are now moot. In its complaint seeking declaratory judgment, Aetna asked the Court to 
declare that Raritan was not entitled to any payments from Aetna or AWCA participants 
greater than what it had already received. Raritan opted out of the AWCA program on 
August 6, 2010, and the statute of limitations has run on any claims for additional 
reimbursement it might have brought against AWCA participants. See N.J. Stat. Ann 
§ 2A:14-1 (six-year limitations period for tort and contract claims); see also N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 34:15-51 (two-year limitations period for workers’ compensation claims). 
7 
 
 Accordingly, every component of Aetna’s declaratory judgment claim is either 
moot or was finally decided as the mirror image of Raritan’s contract claim. Hence we 
may exercise jurisdiction over Raritan’s appeal.  Skretvedt, 372 F.3d at 201. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 District courts may grant summary judgment if, “drawing all inferences in favor of 
the nonmoving party, ‘the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file[] and 
any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott 
Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 580–81 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Our Court 
reviews the grant of summary judgment anew, applying the same standard as the District 
Court. Id. 
 We exercise fresh review as well on whether the law of the case doctrine applies 
to a particular matter. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport v. Coca-Cola Co., 988 F.2d 
414, 429 (3d Cir. 1993). If the doctrine applies, the decision to invoke it is left to the 
discretion of the District Court. Id. 
 We review the District Court’s decision whether to apply judicial estoppel for 
abuse of discretion. Montrose Med. Grp. Participating Sav. Plan v. Bulger, 243 F.3d 773, 
780 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
 Raritan raises fours grounds for reversal. None is compelling. 
 A. Breach of Contract 
 Raritan contends that the words “serviced by” are sufficiently ambiguous to entitle 
it to a trial. If a jury finds that Aetna did not “service[]” the AWCA participants’ products 
within the meaning of MCA § 12.12, the argument goes, Raritan will prevail on its 
breach-of-contract claim. This misses the point. 
 The District Court held that even if the AWCA participants’ products were not 
Plans entitled to the MCA’s reduced rates because Aetna had not “serviced” them, 
Raritan could not recover on its claim for breach. That is because the MCA contains no 
provision imposing obligations on Aetna “related to non-qualifying health benefit plans.” 
J.A. 12. “[T]he terms of the MCA, and the corresponding rights and obligations imposed, 
are confined only to the qualifying Members or Plans.” Id. 
 Because nothing in the MCA prohibits Aetna from informing non-Plans of the 
discounted rates, Raritan asks us to recognize obligations that it believes the MCA 
implied rather than stated outright. Under New Jersey law, “implied provisions may be 
deemed included within an express contract.” Kas Oriental Rugs, Inc. v. Ellman, 926 
A.2d 387, 392 (N. J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007); see also MCA § 11.2 (New Jersey law 
governs MCA). “Arrangements embodied in a contract may be such that the parties have 
impliedly agreed to certain terms and conditions which have not been expressly stated in 
the written document.” Onderdonk v. Presbyterian Homes of New Jersey, 425 A.2d 1057, 
1062 (N.J. 1981). “[B]ut these implied terms do not override express, inconsistent terms; 
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they are imposed to fulfill the intentions of the parties.” Kas Oriental Rugs, 926 A.2d at 
392. 
 Raritan argues that Aetna had the implied obligation to “substantively administer 
or service all of its plans in which [Raritan] was a participating provider” and that Aetna 
was impliedly prohibited from repricing Raritan’s bills for workers’ compensation 
products it did not service. See Raritan’s Reply at 9-10 (emphasis added). If Aetna 
repriced bills for plans that it failed to administer substantively, Raritan contends that 
Aetna must pay it the difference between the hospital’s initial bill and the repriced bill. 
 This fails to show that the obligations Raritan describes were implied by the MCA. 
While § 12.12 defines “Plan[s]” as “health benefit product[s] or plan[s] issued, 
administered, or serviced by” Aetna, it imposes no affirmative duty on Aetna to service 
any health benefit products or plans. Raritan points to MCA § 10.1, but that section only 
contains duties that Aetna owes to Raritan directly (like the duty to list it in Aetna’s 
Participating Provider directory). Moreover, imposing an obligation on Aetna to pay the 
difference between Raritan’s ordinary rates and the MCA’s discounted rates on behalf of 
AWCA participants would conflict with the MCA’s terms, which release Aetna from 
liability for other entities’ failure to pay. See MCA § 3.4 (“[Aetna] shall have no 
obligation to pay [Raritan] . . . in the event that a Payor or Member fails to pay [Raritan], 
except where [Aetna] is the underwriter of the applicable Plan.”). 
 Raritan asks the Court to impose obligations and provide remedies that the MCA 
does not. But a “court should not make a different or a better contract than the parties 
themselves have seen fit to enter into[.]” Conair Corp. v. Old Dominion Freight Line, 
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Inc., 22 F.3d 529, 534 (3d Cir. 1994) (interpreting New Jersey law). Accordingly, the 
District Court was correct in holding that the MCA did not imply the obligations Raritan 
seeks to impose. 
 B. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
 “[E]very contract in New Jersey contains an implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing.” Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 690 A.2d 575, 587 (N.J. 1997).  
Although “[g]ood faith is a concept that defies precise definition[,]” the New Jersey 
Supreme Court has described it as “conduct that does not violate community standards of 
decency, fairness or reasonableness.” Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18 
Shopping Ctr. Associates, 864 A.2d 387, 395 (N.J. 2005) (internal citation and quotation 
marks omitted). “Without bad motive or intention, discretionary decisions that happen to 
result in economic disadvantage to the other party are of no legal significance.” Wilson v. 
Amerada Hess Corp., 773 A.2d 1121, 1130 (N.J. 2001). 
 Raritan argues that Aetna violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing by repricing bills sent to the AWCA participants at the MCA rates when, in 
Raritan’s view, their products were not Plans “serviced by” Aetna. MCA § 12.12. On 
Aetna’s first motion for summary judgment, the District Court dismissed Raritan’s 
breach-of-good-faith claim because there was nothing in the record to indicate Aetna 
acted other than in good faith. When Raritan attempted to revive its claim in its 
opposition to Aetna’s second motion, the Court emphasized that Aetna’s actions 
demonstrated good faith: it sent Raritan notice three months before the AWCA program 
was set to begin and gave the hospital the opportunity to opt out. 
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 The most Raritan musters on appeal is that Aetna could have been even clearer in 
its notice introducing the AWCA program about the services it planned to provide 
AWCA participants. But even if Raritan might have opted out with more information, it 
points to no evidence that Aetna intentionally withheld information or otherwise acted in 
bad faith. The District Court thus properly granted summary judgment in favor of Aetna. 
 C. Judicial Estoppel 
 Raritan contends that the District Court should have stopped Aetna from arguing 
in its second motion for summary judgment that even if AWCA participants’ products 
were not Plans, it had not breached the MCA because, in Raritan’s view, Aetna took a 
different position in its first motion. 
 “[J]udicial estoppel can be a draconian sanction[.]” Klein v. Stahl GMBH & Co. 
Maschinefabrik, 185 F.3d 98, 111 (3d Cir. 1999). “Though there is no rigid test for 
judicial estoppel, three factors inform a federal court’s decision whether to apply it: there 
must be (1) irreconcilably inconsistent positions; (2) adopted in bad faith; and (3) a 
showing that estoppel addresses the harm and no lesser sanction is sufficient.” G-I 
Holdings, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 586 F.3d 247, 262 (3d Cir. 2009), as amended (Dec. 
4, 2009) (internal brackets, quotation marks, ellipses, and citations omitted). 
 Raritan fails at step one. Aetna has not adopted inconsistent positions. In its first 
motion for summary judgment, Aetna argued that the products of AWCA participants 
were Plans entitled to the MCA’s reduced rates. In its second motion, Aetna asserted that 
even if those products were not Plans, it did not breach the MCA by repricing the AWCA 
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participants’ bills. Aetna’s second argument is not inconsistent but merely an argument in 
the alternative. 
 Raritan also fails to show Aetna acted in bad faith. The hospital contends that it 
was bad faith to file a second motion for summary judgment so close to trial. But the 
District Court “in its discretion . . . invited the [second] motion [for summary judgment].” 
J.A. 9. Compliance with that invitation does not infer bad faith. Accordingly, Raritan’s 
invocation of judicial estoppel is unconvincing. 
 D. Law of the Case Doctrine 
 Finally, Raritan argues that the District Court should not have granted summary 
judgment on Aetna’s second motion because the law of the case doctrine prohibits courts 
from adopting inconsistent holdings on successive motions. 
 “[T]he law of the case doctrine does not limit the power of trial judges to 
reconsider their prior decisions [granting summary judgment]” as long as they “explain 
on the record why [they] [are] doing so and take appropriate steps so that the parties are 
not prejudiced by reliance on the prior ruling.” Roberts v. Ferman, 826 F.3d 117, 126 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The District Court easily 
clears this hurdle—it took care to explain the relationship between its decisions on the 
first and second motions for summary judgment, and Raritan had the opportunity to 
oppose new arguments raised in Aetna’s second motion. J.A. 9, 12-13. In fact, by 
carefully explaining how its rulings fit together, the District Court did more than is 
required because the two decisions are consistent. 
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 Raritan contends that the Court implicitly held in its first summary judgment 
ruling that all of Aetna’s conduct with respect to the AWCA participants was governed 
by the MCA. This, it contends, conflicts with the Court’s later ruling that, even if the 
products of AWCA participants were not Plans, Aetna’s repricing of their bills did not 
violate the MCA. 
 Raritan is wrong. Aetna’s first motion focused on the definition of the words 
“serviced by,” and the Court merely held that they were “sufficiently ambiguous to 
preclude summary judgment.” J.A. 13. Moreover, that does not conflict with the District 
Court’s resolution of the second motion. 
* * * * * 
 For these reasons we affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment. 
 
 
